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AbsTRACT
background California’s tobacco tax increased by 
$2.00 per pack in 2017. Although such increases are 
among the most effective tobacco control strategies, 
little is known about their impact from the perspective of 
corner store owners in low-income neighbourhoods with 
high concentrations of tobacco outlets.
Methods We interviewed 38 corner store owners and 
managers in San Francisco’s Tenderloin, the district with 
the city’s highest tobacco outlet density, 60–90 days 
following implementation of the tax increase. Questions 
focused on perceptions of the impact of the higher 
tobacco tax on their revenues, customers and tobacco 
company promotions. We used qualitative content 
analysis to identify, compare and reconcile key themes.
Results Most retailers reported a decline in cigarette 
sales, with customers buying fewer cigarettes, switching 
to cheaper brands or other products like marijuana, or 
trying to quit smoking. Retailers described challenges 
associated with running a small business and selling 
tobacco and concerns about selling a product that is 
’bad’ for customers’ health. Contrary to expectation, 
tobacco companies appeared to be offering few product 
promotions in this neighbourhood.
Conclusions Small, independent retailers’ concerns, 
about selling tobacco and about the health and well-
being of customers, suggest that such retailers may be 
important allies in tobacco control efforts,particularly 
those focused on the point-of-sale.
InTRoduCTIon
California has been a global leader in tobacco control 
since 1988, when it became the first US state to 
implement a tobacco control programme funded by 
an increase in state tobacco taxes (Proposition 99).1 
Smoking prevalence dropped from 33% in 1980 
to 15% in 2015.2 In 2017, California increased its 
tobacco tax by $2.00, to $2.87 per pack of cigarettes, 
through a voter-approved ballot measure. Numerous 
studies have demonstrated that tobacco tax increases 
are an effective means of reducing smoking prevalence 
on a population level by preventing smoking initiation, 
promoting cessation and reducing tobacco consump-
tion.3 4In addition to projected substantial declines in 
cigarette smoking with the implementation of Prop-
osition 56, the $2 per pack increase in the price of 
cigarettes in California is expected to have other posi-
tive and long-lasting impacts through its funding of 
prevention programmes, cancer research, expansion 
of Medicaid (Medi-Cal in California) health insurance 
coverage and more.5 
To date, little attention has been paid to retailers’ 
experiences with and attitudes toward such tax 
increases. In California (and likely other states), 
tobacco retailers, including small store owners, are 
an important constituency for policy-makers and 
the public. Indeed, their opposition to, or support 
for, tobacco control policies can be critical in deter-
mining the outcome of policy proposals.6 Although 
we might expect uniform retailer opposition to 
tobacco tax increases, or to tobacco control policies 
more generally, research in the USA and interna-
tionally suggests that retailers often support some 
tobacco control policies, despite their potential 
economic downsides.7–13 Given the key role that 
retailers play in the tobacco control policy land-
scape—both in influencing policy outcomes and in 
complying with and interpreting policies for their 
customers—we sought to understand their perspec-
tives on California’s recent cigarette tax increase.
The present study draws on interviews with 
corner store retailers in San Francisco’s low-income 
Tenderloin neighbourhood, conducted 60–90 days 
after implementation of California’s $2 per pack 
tobacco tax increase. The Tenderloin has little 
healthy food access, no full serve grocery store, and 
an abundance of tobacco and alcohol outlets.
MeThods
Participants
We recruited corner store retailers from San Fran-
cisco’s Tenderloin neighbourhood during summer 
2017. Of the neighbourhood’s 32 000 racially 
and ethnically diverse residents, 28% live below 
the federal poverty line, compared with 10% city 
wide.14 We approached retailers at 47 of the neigh-
bourhood’s 59 corner stores, all but 2 of which sold 
tobacco at the time of this study, and each of which 
was an independent, family owned ‘mom and pop’ 
store. The decision not to approach the remaining 
10 stores that sold tobacco was based on prior 
knowledge of store owners’ linguistic barriers and/
or history of non-participation in related studies. 
Big chain stores were not included in this sample 
since there are none in this neighbourhood. Close 
to two-thirds of the retailers we approached (n=38) 
agreed to participate in the interviews, with three 
others failing to meet eligibility criteria (eg, being 
a store’s owner or manager and having English 
proficiency), and six declining, typically stating that 
they were too busy. The majority of those we inter-
viewed were immigrants from Middle Eastern or 
South Asian countries who worked 6–7 days a week 
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to keep their businesses running. Most identified as members of 
the Tenderloin community, currently or formerly living in the 
neighbourhood, and having relationships with Tenderloin resi-
dents beyond their roles as retailers.
Procedures and measures
All interviews were conducted in person in the stores by one or 
more of the authors at a time convenient for the retailers. An 
institutional review board-approved script was used to explain 
the purpose and voluntary nature of the study. Interviews lasted 
approximately 30 min, and participants were given a $10 gift 
card as thanks for their time. The open-ended interview ques-
tions concerned retailer perspectives on changes in cigarette 
sales since the tax increase; customer comments about the tax 
increase; discounts and/or promotional offers that might impact 
sales; and interactions with tobacco company representatives 
(see online supplementary appendix A). Retailers reporting a 
decrease in tobacco sales as a problem for their bottom line were 
asked a follow-up question about whether there were resources 
or strategies that might help them make up for lost tobacco 
revenue. Questions about other tobacco products (eg, e-ciga-
rettes, cigars) were not included, in part due to retailers’ time 
constraints. Further, since the $2 tax increase related specifically 
to cigarettes, we believed it important to focus on that product. 
However, any retailer comments on other tobacco products 
were noted and later coded.
Most retailers preferred not to be audio-taped due to discom-
fort with the idea and concerns about the anticipated need to 
interrupt taping to tend to customers. The interviews were 
conducted by two researchers who alternated asking questions 
and taking handwritten notes during and immediately after each 
interview, including relevant verbatim quotes capturing retailer 
perspectives.
data analysis
We (GC, JF and MM) compiled the interview notes and created 
a codebook through a collaborative, multistep process driven 
by the existing literature, our research questions and the raw 
data.15 Using an iterative process of repeated examinations of 
the raw data and group discussions, we further expanded on 
and refined our coding scheme which guided the systematic 
analysis. The codes we developed represented themes capturing 
topics including perceived changes in tobacco sales, customers’ 
reported responses to the tax increase and retailer interactions 
with tobacco representatives and participation in tobacco-com-
pany sponsored promotions (see online supplementary appendix 
B). Using a web- based programme for qualitative data manage-
ment (Dedoose V.7.6.18), we independently double-coded each 
interview and then compared and reconciled differences. We 
analysed findings using qualitative content analysis, identifying 
common themes and patterns, as well as verbatim quotes that 
illustrated the themes uncovered.
ResulTs
Perceived effects of the cigarette tax increase on sales and 
customer behaviour
Although the goal of a cigarette tax increase is to encourage 
cessation by making smoking more expensive, to be effective, 
consumers must face higher prices at retail. While we did not 
collect data on cigarette pack prices or available brands at the 
stores in our study, previous research suggests that smokers 
in neighbourhoods like the Tenderloin had opportunities to 
avoid the full economic impact of the tax increase. Tobacco 
manufacturers, for example, may have lowered the price of some 
cigarettes, or introduced new discount brands to coincide with 
the tax increase.16–18 This could result in substantial savings for 
smokers: pretax hike, the cheapest cigarette pack in California 
cost nearly 21% less than the average-priced pack statewide.19 
Nationally, some premium brands cost less in neighbourhoods 
like the Tenderloin with higher proportions of African-Amer-
icans,20 a pricing strategy that could also blunt the financial 
impact of the tax increase.
In the absence of sales and pricing data, retailers provided us 
with a sense of how they and their customers experienced the 
new tax policy. When the interviews were conducted, 60–90 
days after the tax increase took effect, over 80% (31 of 38) 
of retailers reported a decline in cigarette sales, with a median 
reported decline of 20%–25%. Some indicated considerably 
greater losses, with one commenting, “My [tobacco] sales have 
gone down maybe 30%–40%—–I sell maybe 10 packs of ciga-
rettes a day” (store 22). The remaining retailers reported a 
temporary decline (store 5) or no decline because, according to 
one retailer, addiction was more powerful than a price increase 
(store 18).
In discussing the impact of the tobacco tax increase, retailers 
described a variety of changes in customer behaviour. One 
retailer reported that his customers bought cigarettes at high-
er-volume competitors, who could afford to offer discounts: 
“People don’t buy from me anymore. They come, and they get 
upset over the price—so they go to the store like the gasoline 
[station] because they sell higher volume and have better price for 
the same product” (store 39). Other retailers said that customers 
bought cigarettes illegally ‘on the street’ (store 31), switched to a 
cheaper store-bought brand (store 2, store 4) or to cigars (store 
4), purchased (less expensive) roll-your-own tobacco (store 25), 
purchased one pack every 2 days rather than daily (store 17), 
‘tried to quit’ (store 31) or ‘quit because they [were] forced to’ 
(store 34). Some customers also reportedly switched to mari-
juana ‘because they say it is cheaper, and it is better for you’ 
(store 25) or to e-cigarettes (store 10). One retailer claimed that 
the tobacco tax increase had the opposite of its intended effect, 
at least initially: “[Customers are buying] more, actually. I’m 
shocked at how many people are buying [at the new] retail price. 
They are buying three packs. They may be thinking the price will 
go up” (store 1).
Retailers also shared with us the frustration and suspicions 
some of their customers had voiced about the use of the new 
tax revenue:
People complain…to me about it. ‘Where is all their money 
going? What are they doing with all this tax money?’ They say 
they don’t see changes. ‘What are they using this for? When are 
they going to fix up the neighborhood?’ You know like that law 
they passed to pick up cigarette butts. They said they were going 
to use the money to clean up the streets, but you still see cigarettes 
all over. I tell them it takes time; it’s not going to happen from 
one day to the other. (Store 18)
Another retailer commented that “Some people ask why 
they don’t offer something like classes on quitting. Why 
is the main thing always to raise the price of cigarettes?” 
(store 26).
Taxes and other challenges associated with tobacco sales
Many retailers voiced concerns about how declines in tobacco 
sales had affected their store’s profits, or bottom line, with a 
few noting that it was among the constellation of factors causing 
them to consider selling their business. As one retailer explained:
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They [my customers] complain [about the tax hike], and some go 
to another store. That hurts my business. This tax and that one! 
I’m waiting for my lease to be over in 3 years and then I’ll go back 
to my old job [nursing]. (Store 27)
One retailer, did, in fact, sell his store in the 3 months following 
our interview; however, without longer term follow-up, it is 
unclear whether other retailers were simply venting frustrations 
or actually intending to sell their businesses. Further, even if 
stores are sold, it is difficult to determine the degree to which 
tobacco taxes versus other expenses (including rising commer-
cial rents) are responsible.
Many retailers described numerous challenges associated 
with both selling tobacco and running a small business. One 
commented that after the tobacco tax increase, “I only make 60 
cents per pack, and it’s a high cost inventory product. It’s like 
holding money on the shelf” (store 23). He added that stocking 
and maintaining displays of this high-cost product while also 
deterring theft required a lot of effort (store 23). Other retailers 
expressed concerns about theft; indeed, one store owner said 
that he could not participate in the interview because he had to 
remain constantly vigilant about people coming into the store. 
Selling tobacco also added to retailers’ already-heavy paperwork 
burden, since such sales required both state and local licensure. 
When added to requirements to purchase permits ‘for almost 
everything’ (store 36) and attempts by underage customers to 
illegally purchase cigarettes, selling tobacco, now with an even 
lower profit margin, was described by many merchants as 
stressful.
Finally, several retailers captured some of the ambivalence 
they and others felt about being able to have a store with a 
healthy bottom line and, at the same time, helping residents quit 
an unhealthy behaviour:
Tobacco sales have gone down. I would say about 20%. It’s a 
good thing and a bad thing. A good thing because people are 
smoking less. (Store 16)
Some people say they are going to quit, and I say that is good. 
(Store 14)
It would be even better if they STOP all sales of cigarettes. Really 
that would be better foreveryone. (Store 36)
Coupons and contracts
We asked retailers about a reported21 increase in tobacco compa-
ny-sponsored coupons for California customers intended to 
offset the higher per-pack cost. All but three stated that they 
had not noticed an increase in the number of customers coming 
in with coupons for tobacco products. For some retailers, this 
was explained, in part, by their long-standing refusal to accept 
coupons. These retailers asserted that while coupons might work 
for large businesses and gas stations with a high volume of sales, 
they were not practical for small family-owned stores in poor 
neighbourhoods. The number of customers bringing in coupons 
was too few to justify the time involved in redeeming coupons:
It’s too much work… You have to save [the coupon] and mail it in 
and then wait for [the reimbursement] to come in, and if you lose 
the [coupon] you have to fill out a lot of paperwork. (Store 21)
In addition to offering customers discounts, tobacco companies 
typically offer retailers financial incentives to sell and advertise 
their products. These include ‘slotting fees,’ payments to retailers 
that guarantee prime display space for particular brands; volume 
discounts; and ‘buydowns’ that reimburse retailers for the differ-
ence between the inventory price and a specified sale price, 
usually offered for a limited time.22–25 When asked whether they 
had contracts with tobacco companies, the majority of retailers 
said ‘no’. Some commented that although they had previously 
had tobacco sales contracts, they no longer did. These retailers 
had either opted out of extending them (in some cases, because 
they saw contracts, like coupons, as not worth the trouble), 
or tobacco companies were no longer offering them, probably 
due to low sales volumes. One retailer who previously had a 
Newport contract explained why he decided to end it:
And the way that works is… they ask you to sell large amounts 
of their product, about 5000 units, and at the end of the year, 
they cut you a check of a couple hundred dollars. But I didn’t like 
that—you are just selling more of their product for them. I didn’t 
think it was worth it. (Store 9)
Seven retailers reported that they did have current tobacco 
contracts that featured incentives tied to sales volume (which was 
often low) and/or buy-downs. Retailers who had contracts that 
permitted buy-downs stocked cigarette packs with ‘cents off ’ 
coupons directly on the package. As one store owner remarked, 
however, the per-pack discounts had actually decreased around 
the time of the tax increase, from ¢75 off to ¢50 off (store 8).
When asked when the last time was that a tobacco company 
representative had come in, many retailers explained that the 
representatives had stopped coming altogether. Overall, it 
appears that tobacco companies no longer expend much energy 
on pursuing contacts with retailers in this neighbourhood.
Retailers’ concerns for their customers’ health and well-being
Despite frequently expressed worries about business losses in the 
wake of the cigarette tax increase and other taxes and restric-
tions, many retailers also expressed concern about the health 
and well-being of their customers and community. For example, 
some retailers commented that the tax increase imposed an addi-
tional financial burden on people who were already destitute. As 
one retailer explained, “The tax is hard on my customers because 
they’re low income, so spending more on cigarettes leaves them 
with less money for other things” (store 8). Two other retailers 
stressed the need for more help for customers trying to quit, with 
one commenting, “We need more education… Even if [the price] 
is $12 a pack, people will still buy it.”
Other retailers, however, described efforts they had taken to 
discourage smoking, noting that it was ‘bad’ for their customers. 
As one retailer remarked, particularly when his customers bought 
multiple packs of cigarettes at a time, “I tell them to slow down… 
I tell [them] to quit” (store 1). Another retailer had posted near 
the cash register inspirational messages about changing habits 
and before and after pictures of a long-time smoker, ravaged 
by lung disease (store 13). Concerns for customer health and 
well-being similarly were described by Tenderloin retailers in 
a separate qualitative study of their attitudes towards healthy 
retail.26 In that study, too, retailers spontaneously brought up 
actions they had taken to discourage smoking among customers 
(eg, sharing tips on quitting), and helping homeless people. 
Although some of the comments of retailers in the present study 
(eg, on the regressive nature of the tax and the need for smoker 
education rather than more taxes and regulation), appear to 
echo tobacco industry messaging,27 others do appear to suggest 
genuine retailer concerns for their customers and community.
When asked if there were resources or strategies that might 
help compensate them for losses due to declines in tobacco sales, 
most retailers said that they had not yet given it much thought. 
Others, however, mentioned strategies for selling healthier items 
and suggested that ‘selling more groceries’ or selling healthier 
groceries could help them stay afloat, with the added benefit 
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of being good for their customers. Retailers spoke with enthu-
siasm about trying to change their business models towards more 
fresh food and affordability, in part for the sake of local resi-
dents. As one retailer explained, “I am really trying to make my 
store a community store. I keep my groceries and produce at an 
affordable price” (store 1). One retailer described his desire to 
sell more food, while also noting that doing so required finan-
cial resources that were now potentially further out of reach 
due to declines in tobacco sales: “I need to sell more to make 
the money to put into the store” (store 1). Two others reported 
hoping to overcome this problem by joining the city’s healthy 
retailer incentive programme (Healthy Retail San Francisco)) 
which provides benefits including store redesigns to selected 
corner stores that wish to change their business model towards 
more fresh produce and other nutritious products while limiting 
selling space for tobacco and alcohol.28
dIsCussIon
In neighbourhoods like San Francisco’s Tenderloin that lack 
supermarkets, corner stores are a key source of tobacco for 
residents, and corner store owners are likely to have a unique 
perspective on the impact of a tobacco tax increase. Our study 
had limitations, including a small, non-generalisable sample of 
small independent retailers in one neighbourhood, a lack of 
point-of-sale data to confirm retailers’ impressions of cigarette 
sales patterns following the tax increase, and the possibility that 
retailers may have overstated their dissatisfaction with tobacco 
sales specifically or retailing more generally. Note-taking during 
the interviews instead of audio-recording, while necessary, may 
have resulted in omissions, research bias such as putting more 
weight on certain responses, and misreporting of verbatim 
quotes. Despite these limitations, however, the study offers a 
window into the localised response of customers, retailers, and 
the tobacco industry to the first statewide tobacco tax increase 
since 1998.
Most corner store owners and managers we interviewed 
experienced a decline in cigarette sales in the first few months 
following the tax hike. They reported that customers engaged in 
a variety of activities to try to reduce the financial impact of the 
tax, including reducing consumption or trying to quit smoking, 
switching to cheaper brands or sources of cigarettes, substituting 
different types of tobacco products for factory-made cigarettes 
(eg, roll-your-own tobacco, cigars), or replacing tobacco with 
marijuana. Most of these responses are consistent with previous 
research exploring the economics of tobacco use, particularly 
among low-income smokers. For example, following a cigarette 
tax increase, lower-income smokers are more likely than high-
er-income smokers to reduce cigarette consumption29 30; quit or 
attempt to quit smoking30; or switch to a discount brand,29 31 32 
or loose tobacco,29 and/or turn to illegal sources of tobacco.33 
Substituting marijuana for cigarettes has not been previously 
reported as a response to an increase in cigarette prices. It 
contradicts earlier research suggesting that higher cigarette 
prices reduce the probability and frequency of current marijuana 
use.34 35 Additional research, with larger and more representative 
samples of retailers, gathered in conjunction with policy changes 
affecting cigarette prices and availability could help shed further 
light on this issue.
Retailers’ reports of customer questions about the uses of 
cigarette tax revenue and desire for smoking cessation assistance 
rather than higher taxes highlight the potential risk of smokers 
feeling uninformed about or alienated from policy decisions 
that affect them, and consequently, less likely to support new 
tobacco control measures.36 San Francisco smokers have access 
to several free sources of smoking cessation assistance, including 
the state’s telephone helpline. Although the California helpline 
issued a press release (also posted on social media) reminding 
residents of helpline resources the week that the higher tax went 
into effect,37 more may be needed to enhance public awareness, 
particularly in low-income communities, at a time when cessa-
tion help may be most needed. Creating a media campaign that 
directly links a tax increase to available cessation services could 
help promote understanding that smoking cessation is a major 
goal of the tax increase.
Although media reports had led us to anticipate an increase 
in tobacco companies’ provision of coupons or other incentives 
in the Tenderloin as a ‘secret weapon’ against the tax increase,21 
this was not borne out in our study. Indeed, our findings 
suggested that tobacco companies were generally not offering 
many promotions to neighbourhood retailers or customers. This 
may reflect the limited number of pre-existing tobacco company 
contracts among Tenderloin retailers, a consequence of retailer 
disinterest and low sales volumes. Tobacco manufacturers may 
also have relied on strategies other than coupons or buy-downs 
that we did not capture—such as lowering the price of or intro-
ducing new discount brands—that are less reliant on retailers’ 
willingness to participate.
Retailers have often served as important tobacco industry 
allies, particularly when opposing local tobacco control efforts.38 
The retailers in our study, however, appeared to have weak ties to 
the tobacco industry. Not only did they have few contracts with 
tobacco companies, but many also expressed ambivalence about 
selling tobacco, whether because of decreasing profitability, the 
stress and ‘hassle’ involved and/or concerns for customer well-
being. These findings underscore the value of viewing retailers as 
potential stakeholders in tobacco control efforts.13 In San Fran-
cisco, this recognition has already borne fruit: retailer outreach 
and engagement by the Department of Public Health and others 
proved vital to the passage of a 2014 ordinance capping the 
number of tobacco retail licences at 45 in each of the city’s 11 
districts.39 For other communities, a first step towards enlisting 
tobacco retailers as tobacco control allies may be to assess the 
strength of the relationship between retailers and the tobacco 
industry—it may be weaker than anticipated.
Communities could also try to capitalise on small retailers’ 
negative experiences with selling tobacco (including low profit 
margins and high stress) to encourage them to minimise or 
abandon such sales. A key selling point of San Francisco’s healthy 
retail programme mentioned above is the higher profit margins 
retailers can realise on fresh produce compared with cigarettes.40 
Jurisdictions that have tobacco licensure could consider offering 
tax or other incentives to store owners who permanently give 
up their tobacco licences. This could be promoted with a ‘quit 
tobacco’ campaign that emphasised not simply the health bene-
fits to the community (an approach taken in 2008 by the New 
York State Department of Health),41 but also the financial and 
mental health benefits for retailers.
Given the limitations of our study and the small number 
of earlier studies that have examined tobacco retailers’ 
perspectives on selling tobacco, and on tobacco control poli-
cies,7–13 42 43 further research is needed. Little is known, for 
example, about the perspectives of large retail chains that 
sell tobacco, although some information is available on those 
that have discontinued the practice.41 44 More research is also 
needed on small retailers to understand their attitudes towards 
selling tobacco, any patterns in their relationships with tobacco 
companies and so on. Both types of research would benefit 
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from point-of-sale data to help confirm retailers’ experiences 
and shed light on tobacco company pricing strategies in the 
face of tax increases.
The retail sector is becoming an important focus of tobacco 
control policy discussion, with advocates and researchers 
proposing various strategies to reduce the number of tobacco 
retailers (eg, prohibiting tobacco sales within a certain distance 
of schools, regulating the distance between tobacco outlets, 
confining sales to particular types of stores).45–47 If these efforts 
are to succeed, it will be important to enlist retailers as allies. 
Our study suggests that there may be opportunities to do so 
among small retailers, particularly those with concerns about the 
impact of selling tobacco on their customers’ health and their 
own peace of mind.
What this paper adds
 ► Although retailers are an important constituency for tobacco 
control policies that affect the point of sale, few studies have 
explored the perceptions of small, independent retailers on 
the impact of tobacco tax increases on their customers and 
businesses. Our qualitative study contributes to this small 
literature.
 ► This study of tobacco retailers in a low-income multiethnic 
neighbourhood in San Francisco with the highest 
concentration of tobacco outlets found that the great 
majority reported that the immediate impact of California’s 
$2 per pack tax increase was a reduction in sales.
 ► Some retailers expressed ambivalence about selling a 
product that is bad for their customers, and few had formal 
relationships with tobacco companies, suggesting that 
retailers in this neighbourhood may be enlisted as tobacco 
control allies.
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